sl_relay (E)​/Security

sl_relay

• Access control of Viewer can be done in each machine according to the access list.
• It is possible to communicate HTTPS with Viewer between sl_relay. When all users in the site are untrustworthy, it is necessary to use HTTPS.
• The Dos attack is unverified. (Perhaps, sl_relay will be down?)

Relay Controller

• The Relay Process Controller disregards the packet excluding localhost.
• The Relay Process Controller inspects the received command by the password.

Relay Process

• Viewer that begins communicating is memorized (IP address and port number), and the communication from other machine is disregarded.
• When IP address and the port number of source are camouflaged, it is possible to send the packet of the imitation to the UDP Relay Process. However, this weakness exists originally in Second Life.
• When HTTPS is not used, by camouflaging IP address and the port number of the transmission source, it is possible to send the packet of the imitation to the HTTPS Relay Process.

When you use the WEB Proxy function of Viewer

When the WEB Proxy function of Viewer is used, the session can be taken over by attaching while it tries to recognize Internet Protocol address and the port number in the relay process.Though a considerable technology is necessary, it is logically possible. However, when HTTPS is used to communicate, Relay Process cannot be taken over (in real time).

Injection of false packets

When the IP address and the port number of the transmission source are camouflaged, there is a danger that false packets could be injected.